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Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability,
Disaster, and the Future of the American City


Lisa Grow Sun

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake rocked Japan
and triggered a massive tsunami that devastated the country’s
northern coast.1 While the cautionary tales of this heart-breaking
disaster will be written over many years or even decades, some critical
lessons can already be discerned. Japan’s experience confirms, for
example, that strict, well-enforced building codes are crucial tools for
mitigating disaster risk.2 There is little doubt that an earthquake of
this magnitude would have killed many more people had it occurred
in almost any other densely populated urban area. Japan’s famously
strict building codes saved many, many lives—likely reducing the
death toll by tens of thousands.3
The relative success of Japan’s building codes, however, should
not obscure an equally important lesson: we cannot “build away” all
disaster risk. No matter how stringent, no matter how well enforced,
no matter how costly, building codes cannot eliminate disaster risk.4
. Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. The author thanks Professors Dan Farber, Robert Verchick, Robin Kundis Craig,
Lesley McAllister, Gregg Macey, Blake Hudson, Brigham Daniels, Alex Camacho, Amy
Wildermuth, Lincoln Davies, and RonNell Andersen Jones for their excellent feedback on the
ideas explored in this Article. She also appreciates the research assistance of BYU students
Stephanie Barclay, Dustin Glazier, and Brandon Seal.
1. See Norimitsu Onishi, Reeling From Crises, Japan Approaches Familiar Crossroads,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/
20/world/asia/20future.html?_r=1&.
2. James Glanz & Norimitsu Onishi, Japan’s Strict Building Codes Saved Lives, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/12/world/asia/12codes.html?.
3. See Marlowe Hood, Tokyo at Risk: Can Megacities Cope with Disaster?, AFP.COM
(Mar. 20, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/85qxbyd (quoting the assessment of Helena Molin
Valdes, deputy head of the U.N. International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, that if the
March 11, 2011 Japanese earthquake “had happened in a megacity with less preparedness
capacity, the toll would have been in the millions, at least the hundreds of thousands”).
4. Perhaps different building standards could also have provided fuller protection
against the ravages of the tsunami. Some experts suggest that more tsunami-resistant buildings
can be designed. See Renata D’Alieso, Engineers’ Goal is Tsunami-Resistant Buildings, THE
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Even when life can be preserved, the cost of property and other
economic damages can be staggering. Moreover, structural solutions
to disaster risk—such as strengthening building codes or building
seawalls and levees—can sometimes deceive communities into
increasing their exposure to hazards by lending a false sense of
security through the air of invincibility that surrounds much modern
engineering and construction.5 These measures can mask a basic
truth: a community’s location is likely to be the single most
important factor in determining a community’s vulnerability to
natural disasters.6 Poorly designed cities in relatively “safe” locations
may well fare better than the most carefully designed cities in
particularly hazard-prone regions.7
The fact that location is such a crucial determinant of disaster
vulnerability might suggest, at first glance, that we have the capacity
to mitigate disaster risk only at the margins, because settlement
patterns were established, and major cities sited, long ago.8
However, the deterioration of existing infrastructure, together with
the infrastructure demands of a growing population, suggest that the
largest potential gains in disaster mitigation can yet be achieved by
making wise decisions about the location of new infrastructure. 9 In
the United States, a large percentage—likely well more than half—of

GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/world/asia-pacific/engineers-goal-is-tsunami-resistant-buildings/article1940635/. Even
if they are correct, however, significant residual risk is likely to remain. Id.
5. Structural flood protection measures “include dams, levees, floodwalls,
channelization, and other engineered techniques.” ASS’N OF STATE FLOOD PLAIN MANAGERS,
FLOODPLAIN MGMT. 2050, REPORT OF THE SECOND ASSEMBLY OF THE GILBERT F. WHITE
NAT’L FLOOD POL’Y FORUM 19 (2007) [hereinafter FLOODPLAIN MGMT]. Levees have a
well-documented Field of Dreams effect—“if you build them, they will come”; that is, levees
spawn additional building in their shadow. See John Ritter, Several Cities are Dependent on
Vulnerable Levees, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2005, at A6, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-11-vulnerable-levees_x.htm
(describing
how aging agricultural levees have come to protect large populations).
6. See U.N., 2009 GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON DISASTER RISK REDUCTION:
RISK AND POVERTY IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 19 (2009) (concluding that disaster risk is
“geographically highly concentrated”).
7. Cf. DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL
HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 155–56 (1996) (‘‘No single approach to bringing
sustainable hazards mitigation into existence shows more promise at this time than increased
use of sound and equitable land-use management.’’).
8. See Ritter, supra note 5.
9. Id.
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the infrastructure that we will need in 2050 to accommodate our
growing population does not exist today.10
Thus, the most far-reaching and important question for disaster
mitigation today is where we will channel the growth that will be
needed to accommodate our expanding population. Increasingly,
environmentalists are promoting sustainability agendas—such as
Smart Growth—that have a ready-made answer to this question:
channel growth into existing cities.11 This preference for increasing
the density of existing urban centers is understandable, as the costs
of sprawl are substantial.12 However, this prescription and the various
legal tools being used to implement it throughout the country often
fail to grapple both with the serious disaster exposure facing many of
our great American cities and with the concomitant potential that
channeling future growth back into these cities may significantly
exacerbate the disaster risk faced by future generations. While Smart
Growth has great potential for making our communities more
livable, more cost effective, and more environmentally sound, “Smart
Growth in dumb places”—those that are particularly disaster
prone—is the antithesis of true sustainability. This Article explores
this critical tension between disaster mitigation and current
sustainability policies.13
Although environmental protection and disaster mitigation are
often fellow travelers, these sustainability initiatives may put
significant environmental policies on a collision course with the goal
10. See, e.g., Arthur C. Nelson & Robert E. Lang, The Next 100 Million, PLAN., Jan.
2007, at 4 (arguing that the United States may reach 400 million by 2037, which will require
the nation “to add about 40 million new housing units to its current inventory of 125 million
and replace another 30 million homes that are likely to be damaged or torn down in the next
three decades”).
11. See infra notes 29–41 and accompanying text; supra notes 5–6 and accompanying
text.
12. See sources cited infra note 24.
13. Studies in other disciplines have documented that Smart Growth is occurring in
some hazardous locations. See, e.g., Yan Song et al., Smart Development in Dangerous
Locations: A Reality Check of Existing New Urban Developments, 27 INT’L J. OF MASS
EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 1, 1 (2009) (finding “that New Urbanist developments are
vulnerable to floods throughout the U.S. and a substantial number (36%) of New Urbanist
developments are exposed to flood[] . . . hazards”). They have also found that Smart Growth
developments are “significantly” more likely than traditional developments to rely on structural
solutions (such as stream channel modification) to mitigate flood risk. See id. at 17. While
these studies have made important contributions to our understanding of the relationship
between Smart Growth and hazards, they have not focused on the ways in which Smart
Growth’s emphasis on urban renewal is actually driving this risky development.
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of mitigating natural disaster risk. This result is particularly ironic
given that much of the recent support for these initiatives has been
motivated and framed by concerns about climate change.14 Yet, our
current sustainability policies may inadvertently be driving patterns
of growth that will amplify, rather than mitigate, disaster risk,
particularly in the face of the more frequent and ferocious hazard
events climate change may spawn. This reality means that some of
our current sustainability policies promoting urban living as a key
method for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions may, in fact, be
hindering efforts to adapt to the effects of climate change. This
collision between climate change mitigation efforts and adaptation
efforts is particularly problematic given the near consensus among
scientists that some climate change is inevitable—and, indeed, is
already under way—and that adaptation efforts will have to play a
critical role in minimizing the effects of climate change on human
populations.15
Moreover, redevelopment efforts designed to direct growth back
into hazardous urban areas—particularly those along coasts or inland
waterways—that have fallen into disuse run counter to the
widespread recognition among disaster scholars and practitioners
that retreating from hazardous areas is perhaps the most costeffective, long-term disaster mitigation strategy.16 Many European
nations, such as the Netherlands, that have long battled the seas and
rivers and have relied largely on structural solutions (such as dikes) to
mitigate disaster risk are now recognizing the need to “make room

14. See, e.g., Tania Katzschner & Gregg Oelofse, Climate Change: A Tipping Point For a
Move Towards Sustainable Development?, in GREEN CITYNOMICS: THE URBAN WAR AGAINST
CLIMATE CHANGE 16, 17 (Kenny Tang ed., 2009) (arguing that “climate change may
represent a leverage point to move towards sustainability”).
15. See BRIAN FISHER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 225 (2008).
16. See, e.g., FLOODPLAIN MGMT., supra note 5, at 24 (“We need to begin a pattern of
gradual and voluntary relocation or strategic retreat from the highest-risk and most ecologically
sensitive areas, with climate change and long-term sustainability both in mind.”); ANNA
PUSZKIN-CHEVLIN ET AL., LIVING ON THE EDGE: COASTAL STORM VULNERABILITY OF THE
TREASURE COAST BARRIER ISLANDS 83 (2007), available at docs.cdsi.fau.edu/cues/
LivingontheEdgeFinalacp-printversion.pdf (concluding that “strategic retreat” is “the most
sustainable coastal hazard mitigation approach in the long term,” and thus that “[t]he sooner
public policy can move away from hazard mitigation aimed at loss reduction through
hardening and insurance risk-sharing to creating a resiliency through appropriate development
that prevents loss damage, the faster our communities will reach a more optimal balance
between cost-positive asset exposure and total storm damage costs”).

2160

DO NOT DELETE

2157

12/20/2011 3:26 PM

Smart Growth in Dumb Places

for the rivers” and to return some floodplain areas to their natural
use.17
Unfortunately, retreat from hazardous areas is notoriously
difficult to implement given pre-existing property rights, the costs
associated with voluntary buy-outs, the likely disruption of existing
community ties that relocation entails, and local political opposition
to relocation efforts.18 Even in the aftermath of devastating disasters,
retreat from hazardous areas rarely occurs.19
Nonetheless, some “underutilized” urban areas near coasts, other
waterfronts, or other natural hazards may present real opportunities
for strategic retreat. Once redevelopment occurs, however, huge
public investments in redeveloped areas (financed by borrowing
against anticipated future tax revenues from the redevelopment),20
increased property prices, and reinvigorated communities will
intensify calls for structural protections and make retreat far more
difficult, even if sea level rise or other conditions ultimately make
retreat the most viable option.
Part II of this Article examines how current environmental
initiatives, particularly sustainability initiatives such as Smart Growth,
promote increasing population density and redevelopment of
existing cities. Part III considers the ways in which channeling
growth into some existing cities may exacerbate disaster risk. Part IV
examines some of the legal tools used to channel growth into
existing urban areas and concludes that these tools often fail to take
adequate account of disaster risk. Finally, Part V considers possible
first steps for making these sustainability initiatives more consonant
with disaster mitigation.

17. See FLOODPLAIN MGMT., supra note 5, at 24.
18. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER TURBOTT & ANDREW STEWART, MANAGED RETREAT FROM
COASTAL HAZARDS: OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 2–3 (2006) (recounting some of the
obstacles facing attempts at managed or strategic retreat from hazardous coastal areas).
19. See id. at 16–18.
20. One of the most popular methods for financing redevelopment efforts is tax
increment financing. See George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans:
The Uses and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427, 436–37 (2011)
(explaining that many redevelopment projects are funded through tax increment financing and
that every state but Arizona authorizes such financing). Tax increment financing is built on the
premise that redevelopment will increase the city’s future property tax revenues. See id. at 437.
To finance current public works needed to support the redevelopment, “[e]ither the public
agency rebates the developer a share of TIF revenues as they are collected, and the developer
borrows against this future cash flow, or the public agency floats bonds secured by the
anticipated tax increment.” Id.
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II. ENVIRONMENTALISM AND URBANISM: AN EVOLUTION
Environmentalism and urbanism have a long and checkered
history. For decades, if not centuries, cities have been the bane of
environmentalists.21 Cities epitomized all the evils of growth: the
profligate consumption of natural resources, the obliteration of
natural topography and land features, the destruction of green space,
the pollution of air and watersheds, and the overwhelming of the
natural carrying capacity of the environment.22 To the environmental
mind, cities were dirty, polluted, and oppressive consumers of
Mother Earth.23
Today, in contrast, many mainstream environmentalists and
environmental law scholars are engaged in a full-blown love affair
with cities.24 Suburban sprawl, rather than urbanization, has become
public enemy number one.25 Sustainability initiatives such as New
Urbanism and Smart Growth extol the virtues of urban life and seek
to replicate urban neighborhoods—with their mixed-use zoning and
pedestrian-friendly streets—in areas outside the historic urban core.26
Beyond patterning suburban neighborhoods on their denser
urban cousins, most conceptions of sustainability, including those
adopted and popularized by various federal agencies and state and
21. DAVID OWEN, GREEN METROPOLIS: WHY LIVING SMALLER, LIVING CLOSER, AND
DRIVING LESS ARE THE KEYS TO SUSTAINABILITY 18 (2009) (“The hostility of many
environmentalists toward densely populated cities is a manifestation of a much broader
phenomenon, a deep antipathy toward urban life which has been close to the heart of
American environmentalism since the beginning.”).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Robert Cervero, Growing Smart by Linking Transportation and Urban
Development, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 357, 358 (2000) (“Sprawl stands as a serious threat to a
sustainable future.”); Jeffrey R. Kenworthy, The Eco-city: Ten Key Transport and Planning
Dimensions for a Sustainable City Development, 18 ENV’T & URB. 67, 70 (2006) (“Higher
densities can bring greater protection of the natural environment and food-growing areas in
and around cities.”); Peter Newman, The Environmental Impact of Cities, 18 ENV’T & URB.
275, 285 (2006) (“In terms of global sustainability, it is clear that [cities] should be stopping
[their] sprawl and building up [their] density.”); see also Stop Sprawl: Sprawl Overview, SIERRA
CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/overview/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (advocating
“smart-growth solutions” to the many harms of urban sprawl).
25. See sources cited supra note 24.
26. See New Suburb?: Sprawl vs. “Smart Growth”, NATIONALGEOGRAPHIC.COM,
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/features/00/earthpulse/sprawl/gallery1.html
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2011) (contrasting New Urban development with traditional sprawl
development);
What
is
Smart
Growth?,
SMARTGROWTHAMERICA.ORG,
http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/what-is-smart-growth (last visited Nov. 27, 2011)
(advocating Smart Growth mixed-use communities for urban, suburban, and rural areas).
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local policymakers, incorporate a strong, explicit preference for
channeling future growth into existing urban areas.27 These
initiatives thus encourage and promote revitalization and infill of
existing urban areas, as well as other measures that would increase
the density of existing cities.28
The Obama administration, for example, kicked off one of its
primary sustainability initiatives in July 2009, with the establishment
of the federal joint Partnership for Sustainable Communities between
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).29 One of the Partnership’s six “guiding
livability principles” is to “support existing communities.”30 The
Partnership aims to implement this principle by “target[ing] federal
funding toward existing communities—through strategies like
transit-oriented, mixed-use development, and land recycling—to
increase community revitalization and the efficiency of public works
investments and safeguard rural landscapes.”31 These implementation
priorities emphasize using federal money to redevelop (“recycle”)
land in existing cities and to increase density in those areas to
support mixed-use neighborhoods and public transit. 32
Similarly, one of the Smart Growth principles embraced and
promoted by the EPA calls for “[s]trengthen[ing] and direct[ing]
development towards existing communities.”33 President Obama’s
2009 Executive Order on sustainability likewise emphasizes the need
to channel new federal construction into “existing central cities.”34

27. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
29. Partnership For Sustainable Communities: EPA-HUD-DOT, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/SCP-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 27,
2011). The other five factors are to “provide more transportation choices,” “promote
equitable, affordable housing,” “enhance economic competitiveness,” “coordinate and
leverage federal policies and investment,” and “value communities and neighborhoods.” Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. ABOUT SMART GROWTH, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/
about_sg.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2011).
34. See Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. § 251 (2010) (charging federal agencies to
“advance regional and local integrated planning” by “ensuring that planning for new Federal
facilities or new leases includes consideration of sites that are pedestrian friendly, near existing
employment centers, and accessible to public transit, and emphasizes existing central cities”).
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Countless states and localities have adopted similar sustainability
plans for increasing density in existing cities. New York, for example,
recently passed the State Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy
Act35 to halt public funding of sprawl by requiring state agencies to
submit a “smart growth impact statement”36 for public projects and
to “advance projects” that meet the state’s Smart Growth criteria.
These criteria include “projects located in municipal centers,”
“projects for the use, maintenance or improvement of existing
infrastructure,” and “projects in developed areas or areas designated
for concentrated infill development in a municipally approved
comprehensive land-use plan, local waterfront revitalization plan, or
brownfield opportunity area plan.”37 In Portland, the city’s Bureau
of Planning and Sustainability has adopted “Neighborhood Design
Policies” that encourage “new development” in areas that are losing
housing and “increases in residential density” through “residential
infill development.”38
Scholars, planners, and commentators have likewise argued that
increasing the density of existing cities is the best way to achieve
sustainability aims like decreasing carbon footprint and minimizing

35. See State Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW § 6-0101 (McKinney 2005).
36. Id. § 6-0107.3.
37. Id. § 6-0107.2; see also New York Governor Signs Measure Specifying Criteria for
Smart
Growth,
BNA.COM
(Sept.
1,
2010),
http://climate.bna.com/climate/
summary_news.aspx?ID=142539 (subscription required).
38. CITY OF PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLANNING AND SUSTAINABILITY,
NEIGHBORHOOD DESIGN POLICIES (2008), available at http://www.portlandonline.com/
bps/index.cfm?c=49249&a=223708 (account required); see also Jim Redden, Housing, Cars
Don’t Mix, PORTLAND TRIB., Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/
story.php?story_id=117701496867496300 (“City, regional and state land-use policies call for
new development to be concentrated in existing urban centers and along major transportation
corridors.”). Examples of other areas where smart growth policies are encouraging infill
include several cities in Florida, see Florida Sustainable Communities Demonstration Project,
SMART COMMUNITIES NETWORK (Aug. 1998), http://www.smartcommunities.ncat.org/
success/florida_sust_project.shtml (highlighting Florida cities in which sustainability polices
are encouraging urban redevelopment), and Chicago, see Infill and Redevelopment Regional
Snapshot, CMAP.ILLINOIS.GOV, http://tinyurl.com/88angye (last visited Nov. 27, 2011)
(outlining how Chicago is pursuing “urban infill development [as] a planning strategy that
redirects growth from the urban and suburban fringes, or greenfields, into more dense urban
cores to create compact, livable, and sustainable communities”).
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other environmental ills.39 Sprawl has become the antithesis of
sustainability40 and urbanization its platonic form.41
Smart Growth initiatives appear to be having a real,
demonstrable effect in shifting housing construction toward urban
infill and redevelopment and away from outlying areas. A 2010
report by the EPA found that regions known for their Smart Growth
management techniques, including Portland, Denver, Sacramento,
and Atlanta, are among those cities where the “shift inward” toward
redevelopment of urban centers “has been most dramatic.”42 In eight
regions—Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, Norfolk/Virginia
Beach, Portland, San Diego, and San Francisco—urban
redevelopment accounted for between twenty-five percent and fifty
percent of new residential construction.43 A recent ranking of the
country’s most sustainable cities included six of these regions in its
top fifteen.44
III. URBAN DISASTER VULNERABILITY
These sustainability initiatives may well be on a collision course
with efforts to mitigate disaster risk because increasing the density of
existing cities presents several serious challenges for managing that
risk. First, density itself, regardless of location, can heighten some
kinds of disaster risk.45 Second, increasing density in risky locations is
39. See, e.g., PETER CALTHORPE, URBANISM IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 17
(2011) (“Cities and urban places produce the smallest carbon footprint on a per capita basis.”);
see also sources cited supra note 24.
40. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FREILICH ET AL., FROM SPRAWL TO SUSTAINABILITY: SMART
GROWTH, NEW URBANISM, GREEN DEVELOPMENT AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 29–36 (2d. ed.
2010) (cataloguing the costs of sprawl and contrasting sprawl to sustainable growth).
41. See, e.g., CALTHORPE, supra note 39, at 17 (“[T]ruly great urban places also happen
to be the most environmentally benign form of human settlement and are at the heart of a
green future.”).
42. See EPA, RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION TRENDS IN AMERICA’S METROPOLITAN
REGIONS 2010, at 6, available at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/metro_res_
const_trends_10.pdf.
43. See id. at 14. In eighteen other regions, urban redevelopment’s share of the housing
market “increased significantly.” Id.
44. See Large Cities, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://smartercities.nrdc.org/
maps/large (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (including Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Portland,
San Diego, and San Francisco in the top 15 sustainable cities).
45. Some commentators have previously identified urbanization as a factor in disaster
risk. See MILETI, supra note 7, at 120; CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE:
REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS
30 (2007). However, the relationship between urbanization and disaster risk is likely more
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almost certain to exacerbate disaster risk—and many of our existing
cities are located in risky locations, such as in low-lying coastal areas,
along major earthquake faults, and along major rivers. Moreover, in
many of these cities, much of the land available for redevelopment
and infill—often land along waterfronts—is particularly hazardprone.
The relationship between population density and disaster risk is
complex. Sometimes density can mitigate disaster risk, including
disaster mortality. For example, large multistory buildings can
provide refuge to victims of tsunamis and other flood events.46
On the other hand, density can increase disaster risk in a wide
variety of ways. For example, density may correlate with higher
percentages of impervious surfaces,47 which can elevate flood risk by
increasing both the amount and velocity of surface runoff.48
Increased impervious surface area in cities may also contribute to the
“heat island effect,”49 which can exacerbate heat waves, among the

complicated than has sometimes been assumed. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. In
this Article, I focus on some of the unique challenges caused by increasing density in existing
urban environments.
46. See Michael MacRae, Tsunami Forces Debate Over Vertical Evacuation, AM. SOC’Y
OF MECH. ENG’RS (Apr. 2011), http://www.asme.org/kb/news---articles/articles/
manufacturing---processing/tsunami-forces-debate-over-vertical-evacuation (discussing the
possibility of “vertical evacuation” to the higher floors of multistory buildings during
tsunamis).
47. See Elizabeth Brabec et al., Impervious Surfaces and Water Quality: A Review of
Current Literature and Its Implications for Watershed Planning, 16 J. PLAN. LIT. 499, 499
(2002) (“Increasing urbanization has resulted in increased amounts of impervious surfaces—
roads, parking lots, roof tops, and so on—and a decrease in the amount of forest lands,
wetlands, and other forms of open space that absorb and clean stormwater in the natural
system.”). The increased flood risk associated with density may be localized to the
development site, and these site-specific watershed effects can be minimized by a variety of
techniques promoted by Smart Growth (such as creating or preserving greenways). However,
many Smart Growth developments fail to take advantage of these opportunities to mitigate
flood risk. See Song et al., supra note 13, at 17–18. On the flip side, sprawl can also increase
flood risks. Larger lot sizes (associated with sprawl) may “decreas[e] imperviousness at a sitespecific level” but increase “imperviousness per capita . . . largely due to the additional roadway
lengths necessary to assess the larger lots.” Brabec et at., supra, at 503.
48. See U.N., supra note 6, at 72 (discussing how increasing impermeable surfaces can
increase the quantity and speed of runoff).
49. Fei Yuan & Marvin E. Bauer, Comparison of Impervious Surface Area and
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index as Indicators of Surface Urban Heat Island Effects in
Landsat Imagery, 106 REMOTE SENSING ENV’T 375, 378, 385 (2007) (noting that “[t]he
amount of impervious surfaces is related to population growth and urbanization” and that data
“suggests that impervious surface area accounts for most of the variation in land surface
temperature dynamics”).
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deadliest of natural disasters.50 Moreover, residents of dense urban
areas often face long evacuation times, which can put them at
increased risk of death in many different kinds of disasters, including
fires, floods, nuclear disasters, and terrorist incidents.51 Long
evacuation times also mean that evacuations have to be ordered
earlier for densely populated urban areas to allow sufficient time for
the evacuation to occur. Earlier evacuations are more costly (because
they generate more employment and business disruptions) and are
also more likely to be unnecessary because they must be ordered
when, for example, the path that a hurricane will take is not yet
clear.52 There are also good reasons to think that pandemics may be
50. See Kevin A. Borden & Susan L. Cutter, Spatial Patterns of Natural Hazards
Mortality in the United States, 7 INT’L J. HEALTH GEOGRAPHICS 64 (2008). Dense urban
areas can, of course, employ techniques to mitigate the urban heat island effect, such as
rooftop gardens and urban parks (and dense development might leave more land available for
the latter). Additionally, one study has found that from 1956 until 2005, “the most sprawling
cities” in the United States “experienced a rate of increase in [extreme heat events] that was
more than double that of the most compact cities.” Brian Stone et al., Urban Form and
Extreme Heat Events: Are Sprawling Cities More Vulnerable to Climate Change Than Compact
Cities?, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1425, 1426 (2010). The authors conclude that “urban
sprawl contributes to [extreme heat event] frequency” perhaps because “sprawling patterns of
urban development” increase deforestation, which in turn may increase the urban heat island
effect. Id. at 1427. However, the study considers only the rate of change in extreme heat
events and does not consider whether the rate of change might be lower in compact urban
areas because those areas already had higher absolute numbers of extreme heat events in 1956,
the first study year. Moreover, the study’s unit of analysis is the “metropolitan region,” which
may overlook variability within the metropolitan area. The urban heat island can be a very local
phenomenon. See Kevin E. Trenberth et al., Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 235, 243–45 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch3s3-2-2-2.html (observing that
“[u]rban heat island effects are often very localized”). Thus, in a “compact” metropolitan
region, there might be far fewer extreme heat events in outer areas of the region (because
vegetative cover has not been depleted) and more extreme heat events in the city’s densest,
most urbanized areas. The relationship between density and the urban heat island effect is one
that deserves further study.
51. A recent NPR report suggested, for example, that the January 2011 flooding in
Brisbane, one of Australia’s largest cities, might have been more “chaotic and deadly” if
Brisbane’s two million residents had been more “densely concentrated.” Anthony Kuhn,
Australian City Empties as Floodwaters Crest (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 12, 2011),
http://tinyurl.com/6prdfkm.
52. See William R. Travis, A Future of Mass Evacuations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2011),
http://tinyurl.com/6sbmmsb (“More troubling is that growing coastal populations mean
evacuations must be ordered further in advance of the storm, while the iron-clad law of
forecasting, that reliability decreases with lead time, means that more evacuations will be
ordered with even less certainty of a storm.”).
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more lethal in dense, urban areas than in areas where people do not
live in similar proximity. Studies of the 1918 influenza pandemic, for
example, suggest a positive correlation between population density
and epidemic mortality.53
Additionally, the cascading failure of interdependent critical
infrastructure systems—such as water, electricity, and health care—
during disasters can pose unique risks in dense urban areas,
particularly because the massive scale of these systems makes quick
repair difficult.54 Urban dwellers are also likely to be most at the
mercy of our increasingly “just-in-time” economy because they often
lack space to store extra food and water and lack quick access to
backup emergency supplies.55 Thus, disaster-induced supply chain
disruptions may create immediate and serious shortages in urban
areas.
Increasing density concentrates not just population but also
resources—including the resources needed for effective disaster
response. This concentration of response resources can be
advantageous if those resources emerge from the disaster unscathed.
If, however, they are destroyed in the disaster event, the resulting
equipment shortages and communication failures can seriously
hamper response and relief activities.56
Channeling growth into existing cities also exacerbates disaster
risks, above and beyond the general concerns of density, because
many existing urban centers are located in relatively risky locations.
Many of our biggest and oldest cities are built in areas with high
exposure to natural hazards. “Throughout history, people have
settled in places where Mother Nature is both friend and foe.”57
Consequently, existing cities are often “hotspots of disaster risk.”58
53. See Thomas A. Garrett, Pandemic Economics: The 1918 Influenza and Its ModernDay Implications, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Mar./Apr. 2008, at 80–82.
54. See STANLEY E. MANAHAN, ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMISTRY 745 (8th ed. 2005)
(explaining how the “complexity of urban infrastructure” increases the likelihood of cascading
infrastructure failures).
55. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2010).
56. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED 37 (2006) (recounting the difficulties in Katrina response created by the
loss of the Orleans Parish Emergency Operations Center, “extensive damage” to the “facilities
and equipment” of “[m]any State and local public safety agencies,” and the “complete
devastation of the communications infrastructure”).
57. See, e.g., FARBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 23.
58. Mark Pelling, Urbanization and Disaster Risk, POPULATION–ENV’T RES.
NETWORK, http://tinyurl.com/6ssg2zu (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
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This is hardly surprising as “disaster risk is often coupled with natural
advantages” and because many hazardous locations also boast
incredible natural beauty, recreational opportunities, and other
amenities.59 The settlement of America reflects this general
settlement pattern:
As early Americans moved inland and westward from initial
settlements on the eastern seaboard, they were attracted to the
banks of America’s great rivers—the commercial lifeblood of the
nation—which promised fertile soil and easy access to resources and
distant markets. Others settled elsewhere on the shores of the great
oceans, establishing ports that would service both national and
international markets, and fisheries to exploit the ocean’s
abundance. And many later pioneers would make their homes in
the shadow and shelter of the majestic mountains of the West. Of
course, the very natural advantages that attracted these settlers also
pose great risks: rivers might overflow their banks, low-lying port
cities are vulnerable to hurricanes and other storm damage, and the
violent geological forces that created the majestic mountains might
shake the earth again.60

While these settlement patterns made perfect sense, the result is
that many of the most populous cities in the United States face
alarming disaster risks.61 Some of the cities with the highest natural
disaster exposure include Miami, New Orleans, Oakland, San
Francisco, Honolulu, San Jose, Houston, Los Angeles, and Long
Beach.62 While coastal cities are often at the greatest risk,63 many
interior cities—including Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Sacramento, and
Memphis—also face serious hazard risks.64
The precarious location of so many of our existing cities suggests
that efforts to promote their redevelopment without careful
attention to natural hazard exposure may intensify and exacerbate

59. FARBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 23.
60. Id.
61. See Kevin A. Borden et al., Vulnerability of U.S. Cities to Environmental Hazards, J.
HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 1 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/
jhsem/vol4/iss2/5 (discussing the pattern of urban vulnerability to natural hazards in the
United States and globally).
62. See Natural Disaster Risk—2008 US Cities Sustainability Ranking,
SUSTAINLANE.COM, http://tinyurl.com/4wrvvc (last visited Nov. 28, 2011).
63. See Borden et al., supra note 61, at 11 (finding high hazard exposure “concentrated
along the nation’s hurricane coasts (Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico)”).
64. See id.
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disaster risk. Unfortunately, most sustainability initiatives and the
legal tools that implement them fail to sufficiently consider the
increased disaster exposure they may cause. Much of the relevant
academic literature on sustainability likewise fails to recognize the
potential disaster risk of proposals to channel growth into existing
cities.65 Moreover, as Part IV demonstrates, some of the legal tools
used to implement sustainability initiatives’ preference for existing
urban areas have channeled growth, not only to cities with significant
disaster exposure, but to the areas within those cities that are most at
risk from natural hazards.
A striking example of Smart-Growth-driven efforts to channel
growth into existing urban areas with severe hazard exposure is the
Eastward Ho! initiative in South Florida. The Eastward Ho! initiative
had its roots in a report promulgated in 1995 by the Florida
Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida.66 The
Commission’s charge was to determine how the endangered
Everglades ecosystem could be protected while ensuring a growing
and sustainable economy in South Florida.67 The Commission
concluded that halting westward sprawl toward the Everglades could
best be achieved by channeling most of the region’s future growth
into existing urban areas in the so-called Eastern Ho! Corridor,68
which stretches along Florida’s eastern coast from St. Lucie County
in the north to Miami-Dade County in the south.69

65. See, e.g., CALTHORPE, supra note 39, at 17 (discussing the ways that green urbanism
can shrink carbon footprint and help mitigate climate change without once mentioning the
current disaster risks facing existing urban areas, much less considering the ways in which
climate change is likely to exacerbate those risks); see also FREILICH ET AL., supra note 40, at
29–36 (no consideration of disaster risks faced by urban areas).
66. S. FLA. REG’L PLANNING COUNCIL, EASTWARD HO! REVITALIZING SOUTHEAST
FLORIDA’S URBAN CORE 1 (1999) [hereinafter EASTWARD HO! REVITALIZING].
67. See id. Ensuring the health of the Everglades ecosystem was viewed as important,
not only in its own right, but also to protect the recharge of underground aquifers that supply
water to Southern Florida. See id. at 6.
68. Id. at 4.
69. See ROBERT W. BURCHELL ET AL., EASTWARD HO! DEVELOPMENT FUTURES:
PATHS TO MORE EFFICIENT GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST FLORIDA 4 (1999) (“After the original
designation by the South Florida Regional Planning Council, the Eastward Ho! area was
expanded southward to Florida City in Miami-Dade County and northward to include the
balance of Palm Beach, Martin, and St. Lucie counties, approximating the area between Route
1 and I-95/Florida Turnpike.”). The corridor encompasses “primarily developed lands
bounded by I-95/Florida Turnpike and Route 1 from St. Lucie County to Miami-Dade
County.” Id.
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The obvious problem with redirecting South Florida’s growth
toward the east is that the region’s eastern areas are primarily lowlying and coastal. Indeed, Florida’s southeast coast is notoriously
vulnerable to hurricane damage and flooding. As one recent report
assessing South Florida’s future explained:
South Florida is particularly susceptible to hurricane impacts. It is a
low-lying region where, as of 2000, more than one million people
lived in flood-prone areas and nearly 900,000 lived in Category 1
hurricane surge zones. Miami-Fort Lauderdale was ranked the
worst place in the nation for an extreme hurricane to strike, with
the potential for $61.3 billion in insurance losses. Experts estimate
that “if no other changes are made, and growth continues, a South
Florida hurricane in 2020 might wreak physical damages and
economic losses totaling $500 billion.”70

There is, nevertheless, some debate about exactly how vulnerable
the Eastward Ho! Corridor is to hurricanes and floods. One of the
initial reports exploring and supporting Eastward Ho! claimed that,
while some of the Corridor is particularly susceptible to hurricane
flooding, “[t]he vast majority of the [Corridor] area is free from the
worst hazards of storm surges characteristic of the coastal high
hazard areas of Southeast Florida”71 because the Corridor “includes
the coastal ridge,” which is “an inland strip of relatively high ground
running parallel to the coast” that serves as a “natural defense against
a storm surge.”72
Other assessments of the Corridor’s hurricane and flooding risk
have been far less sanguine about the Corridor’s hazard exposure.
For example, a report prepared for the state by two local universities
identified high flood insurance rates in the Eastward Ho! Corridor as
a significant financial impediment to redevelopment efforts in the
Corridor: “[P]eople in the East are paying the higher rates, not
residents in the suburbs. The reason insurance rates affect
investments in the corridor in comparison to the suburbs is that
70. CTR. FOR URBAN AND ENVTL. SOLUTIONS, FLA. ATL. UNIV., CHARTING THE
COURSE: WHERE IS SOUTH FLORIDA HEADING? 36 (2006) (footnotes and citations omitted).
71. EASTWARD HO! REVITALIZING, supra note 66, at 8.
72. Id. at 7; see also id. at 8 (“The coastal ridge effectively blocks the inland movement
of hurricane storm surges in Palm Beach County.”). The report did acknowledge that the
Corridor includes two areas “particularly susceptible to the effects of flooding from hurricanes:
Central Broward County, east of I-95, which acts as the floodplain for the Middle and New
Rivers, and Southern Dade County, south of Kendall Drive, where the coastal ridge loses its
elevation and eventually terminates.” Id.
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much of the corridor lies within the ‘high risk’ area east of I-95.”73
High flood insurance rates should be viewed not simply as a
“financial impediment” to redevelopment efforts, but as a red flag
that redevelopment of the area in question may concentrate both
people and resources in areas with high hazard exposure.
Nonetheless, the Eastward Ho! initiative’s preference for
channeling South Florida’s future growth into existing urban areas in
the east has been codified in many regional and local planning
documents. For example, Palm Beach County’s Comprehensive
Plan, which was amended in 1996 and then again in 1997 in
response to the 1995 report of the Florida Governor’s Commission,
incorporates an explicit directive to “[r]edirect growth to the East
where services and facilities can be provided and [to] encourage the
revitalization/redevelopment of the coastal communities.”74
73. FLA. ATL. UNIV./FLA. INT’L UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR ENVTL. AND URBAN
PROBLEMS, EASTWARD HO! FINANCIAL IMPEDIMENTS AND SOLUTIONS TO REDEVELOPMENT
46 (Jan. 15, 1998), available at http://docs.cdsi.fau.edu/cues/fin_imp.pdf.
74. PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., PALM BEACH COUNTY 1989 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN:
ORDINANCE 2010-17 1-IA (2010), available at www.pbcgov.com/pzb/planning/
comprehensiveplan/introduction.pdf. This directive is implemented throughout the more
specific elements of the plan. For example, the County’s Future Land Use Element provides
for “bonus densities,” beyond those typically allowed, in most existing urban and suburban
areas. See PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., FUTURE LAND USE ELEMENT, PALM BEACH COUNTY
1989 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: ORDINANCE 2010-17 60 (2011), available at
http://www.pbcgov.com/pzb/planning/comprehensiveplan/2011/FLUE_11_1.pdf.
The
allowable bonuses are higher in the eastern “urban/suburban tier” than in the western areas
“[i]n order to encourage eastward development and a tapering off of density towards the
western edge of the Urban/Suburban Tier.” Id. The Land Use Element does state elsewhere
that “future land designations, and corresponding density and intensity assignments, shall not
exceed the natural or manmade constraints of an area,” taking into account, inter alia, “flood
plains,” id. at 44; however, that admonition is immediately followed by an equally strong
assertion that “[a]ssignments shall not be made that underutilize the existing or planned
capacities of urban services,” id., a command that may well lead to floodplain constraints being
discounted in existing urban areas, particularly those targeted for redevelopment. Other plan
elements attempt to limit both increased densities and public investment in certain high hazard
areas, designated “coastal high-hazard areas.” See, e.g., PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., COASTAL
MANAGEMENT ELEMENT, PALM BEACH COUNTY 1989 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: ORDINANCE
2010-49 12 (2010) [hereinafter COASTAL MANAGEMENT ELEMENT], available at
http://www.pbcgov.com/pzb/planning/comprehensiveplan/coastal.pdf
(“Palm
Beach
County shall not subsidize new or expanded development in the coastal area.”); id. at 13
(“Palm Beach County shall direct population concentrations away from known or predicted
coastal high-hazard areas, and shall not approve increases in population densities in the coastal
high hazard area.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(g)(6) (2011) (requiring that local
coastal management plan elements “[l]imit public expenditures that subsidize development in
coastal high-hazard areas.”); id. § 163.3178(2)(h) (defining the “coastal high-hazard area” as
“the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by a Sea, Lake,
and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model”). While
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Communities outside the designated Eastward Ho! Corridor,
including those along Florida’s Treasure Coast, have also adopted
the initiative’s focus on redirecting growth into existing urban areas
along Florida’s eastern coast.75 The result has been “concerted public
reinvestment in older coastal areas, despite their vulnerability to
coastal storms.”76 As one researcher has noted:
Today, five of the Community Redevelopment Districts on the
Treasure Coast are partially or entirely located in areas that fall
within the Coastal High Hazard Area. Incentives provided by the
Community Development Authority (CRA) [sic] to invest in the
redevelopment of coastal urban areas run counter to the intent of
hazard mitigation principles aimed at limiting coastal asset
accumulation.77

In order to ensure that future growth is concentrated in South
Florida’s eastern regions, rather than its western suburbs, local
governments have employed a number of legal tools, including the
redevelopment districts mentioned above and urban growth
boundaries. Miami-Dade, for example, has an urban growth
boundary—called an urban development boundary—designed to
promote growth in existing urban areas while preventing new
suburban development in the west.78 Part IV next examines how
these restrictions may in theory help to limit growth in the most hazardous areas, some
redevelopment efforts may be subject to less stringent restrictions. See, e.g., COASTAL
MANAGEMENT ELEMENT, supra, at 13 (“Infill or redevelopment densities and intensities in
coastal high hazard areas shall be consistent with existing adjacent development but at densities
and intensities no greater than the adopted future land use designations.”).
75. See, e.g., JAMES F. MURLEY ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF REDEFINING FLORIDA’S
COASTAL
HIGH
HAZARD
AREA
12–13
(Jan.
2008),
available
at
docs.cdsi.fau.edu/cues/CHHAFINALREPORT-MAY212008.pdf (“While the Eastward Ho!
initiative was not directed at the Treasure Coast, the principles of compact and higher density
development have been adopted by the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council in an effort
to efficiently accommodate the housing and accompanying commercial development needed
for the projected population growth in the region.”); see also id. at 12 (“County and municipal
planners throughout much of the Treasure Coast have sought to balance development demand
with agricultural and open space conservation by steering development eastward and focusing
on revitalizing the region’s historic cities and towns.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. EPA, GROWING FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: MIAMI-DADE COUNTY URBAN
DEVELOPMENT BOUNDARY ASSESSMENT 3 (2010) (“The UDB is used primarily to keep
development from spilling toward highly sensitive lands like Everglades National Park.”).
Florida has recently enacted major changes to its growth management laws, which now allow
for longer range planning and devolve most authority over growth management to local
governments. H.B. 7207, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011). It will thus be up to local
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these legal tools used to implement Smart Growth’s preference for
channeling growth into existing cities have incentivized
redevelopment of particularly hazardous urban lands in other parts of
the country.
IV. LEGAL TOOLS IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABILITY’S URBAN
PREFERENCE
As the prior discussion of Southeast Florida demonstrates, there
are a variety of ways in which the preference for channeling growth
into existing urban areas is being translated into law. Two common
approaches include designation of redevelopment districts and
growth management techniques such as urban growth boundaries.
Both of these approaches are driving redevelopment of vulnerable
cities—and, often, driving redevelopment of the most vulnerable
areas within these at-risk cities. Additionally, California has recently
adopted a complex new method for directing growth in that state,
one that also has the potential to channel development into dense
urban areas without giving adequate attention to hazard risk.79
A. Redevelopment Districts
One popular technique for channeling growth back into existing
cities is the designation of redevelopment districts that promise
revitalization and infill of underutilized urban land. These
redevelopment districts often enjoy tax breaks (such as enterprise
zone tax credits), an influx of federal and state spending, special
funding techniques (such as tax increment financing),80 the use of
eminent domain to assemble buildable parcels, and sometimes fasttrack approval processes to incentivize infill and redevelopment.81
One of the most striking characteristics of redevelopment
districts is their tendency to cluster around any waterfront located
within a city.82 This pattern may exist for a number of reasons. First,
governments to decide which growth management measures to keep in place. See id.
79. See Part IV.C., infra (discussing California’s new growth management approach
under SB 375).
80. See supra note 20 (explaining tax increment financing).
81. See, e.g., CAL. REDEV. AGENCY, THE COMMUNITY GUIDE TO REDEVELOPMENT:
CREATING SAFE, PROSPEROUS AND HEALTHY COMMUNITIES 16 (2002) (describing the tools
available to California Redevelopment Authorities to promote redevelopment districts).
82. See BETSY OTTO ET AL., ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN: RESTORING RIVERS,
CONNECTING COMMUNITIES 6 (2004) [hereinafter ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN]
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the economic and spatial evolution of many waterfront cities has left
waterfront areas behind, making them obvious targets for
redevelopment. In fact, these neglected waterfront areas often
represent the only large, contiguous tracts of land available for urban
redevelopment. When many cities were first built, waterfront areas
were prime property because rivers and oceans were the lifeblood of
commerce.83 Factories, warehouses, and shipping facilities all thrived
at the water’s edge.84 Over time, as railroads displaced rivers as the
primary mode of transporting goods, these industries abandoned
their waterfront locations; waterfront areas fell into disuse, and “the
city’s downtown moved away from the river.”85 Related trends also
marginalized ports.86 When the highway construction boom began
in earnest, these abandoned riverfronts provided the path of least
resistance for building highways (with the cheapest land and the least
disruption to existing uses).87 Thus, “many highways were built
along urban riverfronts,” cutting the waterfront areas off “from the
cities they had once spawned.”88 When forward-thinking planners
began to worry about suburban sprawl—a concern that has become
central to Smart Growth and other sustainability initiatives—
targeting these abandoned areas for infill and redevelopment made
perfect sense.
Second, the waterfront area’s industrial pedigree often left the
land contaminated.89 While contamination is hardly an obvious
selling-point for redevelopment, federal environmental programs
have funded redevelopment of brownfields,90 defined as property
whose use or redevelopment “may be complicated by the presence or
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
(describing an accelerating trend of urban waterfront redevelopment). The City of Sacramento,
for example, has three redevelopment areas, all of which are located along rivers. See
Sacramento Economic Development, Redevelopment Areas, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, http://
www.cityofsacramento.org/econdev/opportunity-areas/redevelopment-areas.cfm (last visited
Oct. 24, 2011). As discussed in Part IV.B, Portland has eleven redevelopment districts, all but
three of which are riverfront. See infra note 162.
83. See ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82, at 2.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2–3.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See EPA, BROWNFIELDS AND LAND REVITALIZATION: GRANTS AND FUNDING
(2011), http://epa.gov/brownfields/grant_info/index.htm.
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contaminant.”91 Some waterfront areas are receiving brownfield
money for redevelopment,92 and sustainability initiatives in many
cities are backing these revitalization efforts to restore the health of
rivers by cleaning up toxins in riverfront land that may leach into the
water.93
Third, waterfront redevelopment holds forth the promise of
creating a unique draw that will bring people back to the city and
create a sense of community place and history.94 On this view,
waterfront redevelopment is valuable not only in its own right, but
also as a catalyst for renewing the entire urban landscape. Indeed,
many Smart Growth advocates herald waterfront redevelopment as
the centerpiece of a city’s urban renewal plans.95 As one prominent
sustainability expert explained, waterfront revitalization is “an
opportunity to give buildings the advantage of waterfront views and
access, and bring the public back to the water’s edge.”96 Among the
many cities that are pursuing this strategy of making the waterfront a
cornerstone of downtown redevelopment efforts are Sacramento,

91. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2004).
92. Andrew O. Guglielmi, Comment, Recreating the Western City in a PostIndustrialized World: European Brownfield Policy and an American Comparison, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 1273, 1306 (2005) (“Another similarity between successful urban brownfield projects,
both in the U.S. and in Europe, is that they seemed to be tied to waterfront areas.”).
93. See, e.g., RIVER RENAISSANCE DIRECTORS, CITY OF PORTLAND, RIVER
RENAISSANCE STRATEGY 3-3 (2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/7om7lo7
(“Redevelopment offers the best opportunities to realize incremental benefits to watershed
health” by “reduc[ing] the amount of urban pollutants that run off into our streams and
rivers.”).
94. See Guglielmi, supra note 92, at 1308 (“In addition to the aesthetic and
psychological benefits, brownfield projects focused around waterways can bring restaurants,
shops, and tourist attractions to raise a city's economic health.”).
95. SMART GROWTH NETWORK, GETTING TO SMART GROWTH II: 100 MORE POLICIES
FOR IMPLEMENTATION 47 (2005), available at http://www.smartgrowth.org/pdf/
gettosg2.pdf.
96. See JONATHAN BARNETT, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: IMPROVING THE NEW
CITY, RESTORING THE OLD CITY, RESHAPING THE REGION 154 (1996); see also Trinity
Uptown Plan, TRINITY RIVER VISION AUTH., http://www.trinityrivervision.org/fwgc/
trinityuptownplan.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (promoting Fort Worth’s riverfront vision
based on Smart Growth principles and asserting that the planned waterfront redevelopment
will “provide a cost-efficient and viable alternative to annexation and urban sprawl”).
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California;97 Norfolk, Virginia;98 Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas;99
Portland, Oregon;100 and many cities in New York.101
Unfortunately, plans to revitalize waterfront areas often are
conceptualized with little attention to disaster risk. One recent
example comes from Augusta, Georgia, where officials heralded the
city’s plans to make waterfront revitalization along the Savannah
River the foundation of its future growth.102 Augusta’s mayor
proclaimed that “[r]iverfront development is key to the future of the
city. We need to bring in projects that will develop a critical mass of
people along the riverfront.”103 The mayor also noted that the
“riverfront is a very underutilized asset for the city of Augusta. We
still have large tracts that aren’t producing [tax] revenue for the
city.”104 Less than a week later, however, the Army Corps of
Engineers declared Augusta’s levees along the Savannah River—the
levees that protect Augusta from serious flooding risk—
unacceptable.105
As this example suggests, too many cities seem to be pursuing
waterfront redevelopment plans—with all their available incentives
and public money—without adequate attention to the hazards of
reconcentrating population and property in flood zones. In
97. See The River District Redevelopment Area,
THE RIVER DIST.,
http://www.riverdistrict.net/about-us/river-district-redevelopment.shtml (last visited Oct.
18, 2011) (“Riverfront development is a key strategy for both establishing a sense of place for
the district, and creating a recreation asset for the entire Sacramento region.”).
98. See BARNETT, supra note 96, at 133–34 (“Norfolk, Virginia, is an example of a
community that has almost completely remade its downtown in order to remain a regional
center. . . . It has rebuilt its waterfront to attract convention visitors and tourists, creating a
festival marketplace, two convention hotels and a convention center, a nautical museum, and a
new downtown baseball stadium.”).
99. Trinity Uptown, CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEX., http://www.fortworthgov.org/
PlanningandDevelopment/info/default.aspx?id=12426 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (describing
planned revitalization of Fort Worth’s riverfront).
100. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
101. See Cities by the Coast, CUNY INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES,
http://www.cunysustainablecities.org/what-we-do/cities-by-the-coast.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2011).
102. Erin Zureick, City Hopes to Expand Near River, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 23, 2011,
at B1, available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2011-01-22/augusta-hopesexpand-near-river.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Brett Buffington, Report Says Augusta’s Levee “Unacceptable,” ABC 6 WJBF-TV
(Jan. 29, 2011), http://www2.wjbf.com/news/2011/jan/29/5/report-says-augustas-leveeunacceptable-ar-1398337/.
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particular, communities are rebuilding in the shadow of levees
without giving appropriate weight to residual flooding risks that exist
if those structural flood control mechanisms fail or their design
capacity is exceeded.
Examination of a prime waterfront redevelopment district in
Sacramento, California sheds further light on this phenomenon.
Sacramento’s River District, one of three redevelopment areas
managed by the City of Sacramento,106 is located less than a mile
from downtown Sacramento “at the confluence of two major
California waterways: the Sacramento and American rivers.”107
Sacramento’s redevelopment plan for the River District will
“transform[]” the 1,050 acre district “from its current, mostly
industrial, businesses into an eclectic, mixed-use community
bordered by a ribbon of parks at the rivers’ edge” that “will feature a
wide range of employment, entertainment and housing options for
families and individuals.”108
Specifically, redevelopment plans feature “a 65-acre mixed-use
development” called Township 9, funded in part by $20 million in
California state infrastructure grants, that will include “2,300
housing units (apartments, condos, townhomes, and live/work
units); 150,000 square feet of neighborhood retail and restaurants;
and over 800,000 square feet of office space.”109 Plans also include a
new light rail station, the transformation of a historic waterfront
street power station into the Powerhouse Science Center (housing a
“science museum, restaurant and conference center, and a
planetarium”), and a new headquarters for the California Highway
Patrol.110 Enterprise Zone tax credits are available to help finance
River District redevelopment projects.111
Given that the River District redevelopment area is located at the
intersection of the American and Sacramento Rivers,112 it is no
106. See Sacramento Economic Development, Redevelopment Areas, CITY OF
SACRAMENTO, CAL., http://tinyurl.com/7gz9ue2 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
107. See River District, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, http://www.cityofsacramento.org/
econdev/opportunity-areas/redevelopment-areas/river-district.cfm (last visited Oct. 24,
2011).
108. Id.
109. CITY OF SACRAMENTO ECON. DEV. DEP’T, RIVER DISTRICT FACT SHEET (2009),
available at http://tinyurl.com/7hr9t7x.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Business, RIVER DIST., http://www.riverdistrict.net/business/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2011) (“The River District is defined by the American and Sacramento rivers on the north and
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surprise that “[t]he majority of the [redevelopment] area is within a
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-designated 100year floodplain.”113 Because the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA)114 requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact
Report (EIR) for this redevelopment project, there is at least some
documentary record of the analysis that supported targeting this
floodplain area for redevelopment.
The EIR explains that most of the River District redevelopment
area is located in a FEMA “shaded Zone X” flood zone, which
designates areas that are protected from a 100-year flood solely by
the presence of levees and other structural flood control
mechanisms.115 Thus, the report notes, “[t]he levees along the
American and Sacramento Rivers provide flood protection to the
[River District redevelopment] area,”116 as do “the upstream
reservoirs and dams, including Folsom Dam and Shasta Dam.”117
The EIR also acknowledges that “[t]he [redevelopment] area is
within the dam inundation zone in the event of failure at the Folsom
Dam,” located upstream from the project on the American River.118
In short, all that stands between these areas and severe flooding
in the event of a 100-year storm are the river levees and upstream
dams (which present their own flooding risks if the dams were to fail
due to compromised structural integrity, an earthquake, or terrorist
attack). However, when determining the project’s impact on flood
risk, the EIR is only charged with determining whether the project
will result in a “significant” impact that will “substantially increase
the exposure of people and/or property to the risk of injury and
damage in the event of a 100-year flood.”119
west and by the Railyards and Central City residential neighborhoods on the south and east. In
1990, the area was designated as a Redevelopment Area pursuant to the provisions of the
California Community Redevelopment Law.”).
113. CITY OF SACRAMENTO CMTY. DEV. DEP’T, RIVER DISTRICT SPECIFIC PLAN: DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT § 5.5-2 (2010) [hereinafter RIVER DISTRICT EIR]. The
100-year floodplain, also known as a “special flood hazard area,” is that “area that will be
inundated by the flood event having a 1-percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any
given year.” See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FLOOD ZONES (2010),
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/floodplain/nfipkeywords/flood_zones.shtm.
114. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2100–02 (West 2011).
115. See RIVER DISTRICT EIR, supra note 113, § 5.5-3.
116. Id. § 5.5-2.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. § 5.5-9.
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With the question so framed, the answer is easy, indeed almost
tautological:
Because levees currently protect the proposed RDSP [River District
Specific Plan] area from a 100-year flood and development in
accordance with the Specific Plan would not be allowed by law to
compromise the integrity of the levees, implementation of the
RDSP would not increase exposure or people and/or property to
risk of injury and damage from a 100-year flood. This impact is
determined to be less than significant.120

Thus, the EIR reads as though the redevelopment will not alter
the status quo in any meaningful way. It does not acknowledge that
more resources and people will be concentrated in a flood hazard
zone and will be subject to potentially catastrophic flooding in the
event of levee failure or overtopping. The EIR’s conclusion that the
status quo would remain unchanged stands in stark contrast to one
commentator’s 2006 prediction that redevelopment of Sacramento’s
River Front and construction of new, dense residential properties
would effectively create “a whole new town on the waterfront,”
bringing “an additional 30,000 residents” to the area.121 He noted,
by comparison, that West Sacramento then had 35,000 residents,
while downtown Sacramento had 39,000.122 Furthermore, he
estimated that the redevelopment would bring an additional 80,000
new office workers and other laborers to the riverfront area.123
This blasé attitude toward the residual risk that exists in flood
zones protected by levees from the 100-year storm also contrasts
sharply with California’s own attempts to raise awareness of residual
risks among its citizens who live in at-risk areas. California’s 2010
Flood Risk Notice—mailed to some 300,000 California residents—
advises those living in the shadow of levees that “[e]ven if a levee is
120. Id. § at 5.5-14; see also id. (“As previously noted, the portion of the RDSP [River
District Specific Plan] area that could be developed is within either the shaded X or X Zone
designations of FEMA; therefore, this area is protected from a 100-year flood. Because the
existing parcels proposed for development within the RDSP are protected from a 100-year
flood and FEMA allows the types of land uses within the flood zones that are proposed by the
RDSP; the individual developments within the RDSP area would be protected from regional
floods.”).
121. Don Lipper, Watermark: If Chris Calbadon Gets His Way, West Sacramento Will
Have
Its
Own
Left
Bank,
COMSTOCK’S MAGAZINE
(Sept.
16,
2011),
http://www.comstocksmag.com/Archive/1006_RF_Yolo--Watermark.aspx.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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designed for the FEMA standard of a 1% annual chance flood, there
is a 1-in-4 chance of a larger flood occurring within any 30-year
period (the life of a typical home mortgage)” and that “[s]ince 1983,
Central Valley State-Federal project levees have been breached or
overtopped more than 50 times.”124
Sacramento’s experience also demonstrates that cities and states
will often face the temptation to catalyze redevelopment efforts by
relocating public buildings and infrastructure to the redevelopment
district. For example, one of the featured cornerstones of
Sacramento’s River District redevelopment is a new headquarters for
the California Highway Patrol.125 The experience of Louisiana’s
National Guard during Katrina, however, illustrates the dangers of
locating public resources—particularly those that are critical to
disaster response operations—in vulnerable areas. Katrina-induced
flooding devastated the Louisiana National Guard’s headquarters in
the Lower Ninth Ward at Jackson Barracks, where floodwaters
reached depths of 18 feet.126 The flooding necessitated the rescue of
some 400 troops, first by boat to the Mississippi River Levees and
then by Blackhawk helicopter to the Superdome,127 a shelter of last
resort. The flooding also disabled the Guard’s joint operations
center, which lost all power and communications during the
storm.128
The EPA, in partnership with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has recently issued Smart
Growth guidance for coastal and waterfront areas to influence how
cities plan their waterfront redevelopment districts, as well as other
smaller-scale infill at the water’s edge.129 Although the guidance does
124. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA FLOOD RISK NOTICE 2010 (2010),
available at http://www.water.ca.gov/floodmgmt/lrafmo/fmb/fas/risknotification/links/
pdfs/2010_Flood_Risk_Notice.pdf.
125. See RIVER DISTRICT FACT SHEET, supra note 109. Portland is also building “a new
police stable in the River District,” a riverfront redevelopment district. See BETSY OTTO ET AL.,
supra note 82, at 140.
126. See Tarell J. Bilbo, Louisiana Guard Rededicates Jackson Barracks, NAT’L GUARD
(Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/11/110810-Louisiana.aspx.
127. See Paul Purpura, Life Returns to Historic Jackson Barracks, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct.
31, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/10/
jackson_barracks_welcomes_back.html.
128. See John Orrell, Hurricane Katrina Response: National Guard’s “Finest Hour,”
NAT’L GUARD (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/08/ 082710Katrina.aspx.
129. See EPA & NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., SMART GROWTH FOR
COASTAL
AND
WATERFRONT
COMMUNITIES
(2010),
available
at
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go some distance in warning communities against waterfront
revitalization that may increase a community’s hazard
vulnerability,130 the primary emphasis is on using Smart Growth
techniques to create dense, mixed-use, walkable communities when
developing waterfronts.131 Indeed, much of the guidance extols the
potential advantages of waterfront redevelopment:
[P]roperties at the water’s edge are prime redevelopment targets,
since they are in or near the historic center of the community, are
well connected to land- and water-based modes of transportation,
and are close to jobs, services, and tourist sites. Waterfront
revitalization can enhance historic, cultural, and scenic resources,
supporting community efforts to maintain a strong sense of place
while protecting the water and other natural resources.132

The guidance also stresses connecting people to the water and
guaranteeing public access to the waterfront itself.133 Sometimes the
very planning tools the guidance identifies for increasing public
access to waterfront areas both allow and encourage increased
density at the water’s edge. For example, in Fernandina Beach,
Florida, “the city established a ‘floating’ overlay district” along the
Amelia River waterfront area “that allows property owners to double
their density if they grant the city an easement to build a public
boardwalk along the riverfront, allow pedestrian access, and maintain
a view corridor.”134
On the whole, this federal guidance emphasizes the advantages
of Smart Growth-style waterfront development, at the expense of
hazard risks. Indeed, some of the cities that the Smart Growth
guidance singles out as examples of successful waterfront renewal

http://coastalsmartgrowth.noaa.gov/report.html.
130. See id. at 31 (“[A]ll coastal and waterfront communities need to consider their
vulnerability to natural hazards such as storms and flooding, and, for those on the coast, the
risks from sea level rise, so that revitalizing the waterfront does not make the community more
vulnerable to natural disasters.”); id. at 32 (“Communities facing the possibility of increased
vulnerability from climate change-related impacts, such as increased flooding and sea level rise,
may need to consider whether infill or redevelopment is appropriate.”).
131. See, e.g., id. at 4.
132. Id. at 31.
133. See id. at 18 (urging communities, as one of the Smart Growth waterfront
development principles, to “[c]reate walkable communities with physical and visual access to
and along the waterfront for public use”).
134. Id. at 19–20.
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have experienced, or been threatened with, serious flooding many
times in the last few years.135
In addition to the redevelopment of potentially risky waterfront
areas, redevelopment districts have also been created in areas subject
to other types of disaster risk. Like waterfront redevelopment,
redevelopment of these vulnerable areas brings people and property
back to disaster’s edge. For example, many current redevelopment
districts in San Francisco are located in areas that have significant
seismic risk.
Relative to flooding risk, seismic risk is somewhat more difficult
to mitigate through land-use choices, because major earthquakes can
sometimes occur along previously unknown faults.136 Nonetheless, it
is possible to make some comparisons of the seismic risk faced by
different neighborhoods and, in particular, to identify
neighborhoods at serious risk for liquefaction—essentially,
“earthquake-induced quicksand.”137 In the San Francisco region,
many of the neighborhoods at highest risk of liquefaction are
essentially artificially created—built on new land created when the
bay was filled. A 2000 Seismic Report by the California Department
of Conservation identified the neighborhoods at highest liquefaction
risk:
Ground failure associated with liquefaction has occurred during
historical earthquakes in San Francisco. In the City and County of
San Francisco the liquefaction zone is concentrated south of
Market Street, in the Mission District, at Hunters Point, in areas of
artificial fill (“made land”) along the waterfront, especially the
Marina District and at Treasure Island, and along the beaches
facing the ocean.138

Strikingly, San Francisco has redevelopment districts (or “project
areas”) in three of these high-risk neighborhoods.139 One of the
135. Compare id. at 23 (pointing to Newburyport, Massachusetts, as an example of
successful waterfront redevelopment), with Angeljean Chiaramida, Flooding Adds to Storm
Woes, NEWBURYPORT NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.newburyportnews.com/local/
x253071011/Flooding-adds-to-storm-woes (explaining recent flooding problems in
Newburyport).
136. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 41.
137. Id. at 40 (“Liquefaction occurs when earthquake shaking of water-saturated, sandy
soil causes that soil to liquefy and lose its strength . . . .”).
138. CAL. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION, SEISMIC HAZARD ZONE REPORT FOR THE CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, 2000, at vii (2001).
139. See Project & Survey Areas, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO REDEVELOPMENT
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most interesting of the redevelopment plans is for Treasure Island,
which the 2000 Seismic report described as “consist[ing] entirely of
sandy and silty artificial fill.”140 The Treasure Island Redevelopment
Plan has been heralded as “the most environmentally-sustainable
large development project in U.S. history” for its transit-oriented
character and open space, and is “one of sixteen founding projects of
the Clinton Climate Initiative’s Climate Positive Development
Program.”141 The redeveloped Treasure Island will boast “8,000 new
residential units (30% of which will be offered at below-market
rates), three hotels, a 400-slip marina, restaurants, retail and
entertainment venues—plus nearly 300 acres of parks and open
space.”142
The EIR for this project tells a somewhat less rosy story about
the extreme engineering and construction measures that will be
necessary to compact Treasure Island’s soil enough to mitigate some
of the liquefaction risk.143 Perhaps the plan will be able to outengineer a major earthquake; however, one thing is clear: thousands
of new residents may be staking their lives on the ability of the
project to do just that.
The revitalization of risky urban areas in redevelopment districts
is being underwritten by federal money, including Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG funds) allocated by HUD, and
state and local tax dollars, through direct public investments and
creative tax breaks and financing.144 The River District
Redevelopment Area in Sacramento, for instance, received more than
AGENCY, http://www.sfredevelopment.org/index.aspx?page=3 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011)
(listing redevelopment project areas for “Bayview Hunters Point,” “South of Market,” and
“Hunters Point Shipyard); Treasure Island: Redevelopment, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, http://www.sftreasureisland.org/index.aspx?page=6 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011)
(describing the Redevelopment Plan for Treasure Island).
140. CAL. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION, supra note 138, at 6.
141. Treasure Island: Redevelopment, supra note 139.
142. Id.
143. See CITY & CNTY. OF S.F. PLANNING DEP’T, TREASURE ISLAND/YERBA BUENA
ISLAND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT II.74 (2010),
available at http://www.sfplanning.org/index.aspx?page=1828 (describing how a more
“stable ‘platform’” for “new buildings and roads” would have to be created by “densification
of [Treasure Island’s] sandy soils” through “deep dynamic compaction” and “vibrocompaction,” and how the areas would also have to be “surcharged” through “preload[ing]
the layer of Young Bay Mud that lies beneath the 50 feet of sand” by “temporarily placing
approximately 15 to 30 feet of soil on the area to be surcharged”).
144. See, e.g., Charles Bartsh, Financing Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment, 18
GOV’T FIN. REV. 26, 28 exhibit 2 (2002).
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a $100 million in federal and local government money.145 Because
the disaster consequences of shifting our urban centers back into
particularly vulnerable areas have been largely ignored, this public
subsidization of disaster risk has not yet received the public scrutiny
it deserves. Moreover, local governments have given inadequate
consideration to the financial risk that a redevelopment project will
be devastated by a natural disaster and the local government will still
be obligated to repay the bonds that financed the project without
the increased tax revenue that it was counting on to make the
payments.
B. Growth Management Laws: Urban Growth Boundaries
Another popular technique for channeling growth into existing
urban areas, and away from outlying suburbs or agricultural lands, is
the adoption of urban growth boundaries146 like that employed by
Portland, Oregon—a city which is frequently heralded by
sustainability advocates as a model of sustainability that other cities
should emulate.147 Urban growth boundaries aim to project the
population (and concomitant housing and commercial development
needs) of a region on some future date and then draw a boundary
around the current metropolitan area in which growth to meet those
needs must occur.148
Urban growth boundaries—particularly those drawn quite
strictly—privilege the current urban form and, by restricting land
available for growth, create pressure to develop (or redevelop) the
land inside the urban growth boundaries at higher densities.149
Indeed, the success of a strict urban growth boundary is premised on
the existence of opportunities to increase density within the city
145. River District Redevelopment Area, supra note 97.
146. Some states, including Oregon, Washington, and Tennessee, mandate that their
cities designate urban growth boundaries. David Bollier, Urban Growth Boundaries, SPRAWL
WATCH, http://www.sprawlwatch.org/ubg.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). Individual cities
that have adopted urban growth boundaries include San Jose (and 14 other California
communities), Boulder, Colorado, and Lexington, Kentucky. See id.
147. See Abby Haight, Portland Gets Its Reward: Most Sustainable City, THE
OREGONIAN, Mar. 26, 2009 (recounting that Portland had earned SustainLane’s “top award”
for most sustainable city every year since the organization began its rankings in 2005).
148. See Bollier, supra note 146.
149. See Eric Mortenson, Metro Says Portland Area has Room to Grow Inside Current
Urban Boundary, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.oregonlive.com/
environment/index.ssf/2009/09/metro_says_growth_can_be_conta.html (discussing how
much land is available in Portland for infill).
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boundaries, primarily by increasing the availability of multifamily
housing in existing neighborhoods and by infilling and redeveloping
underutilized urban spaces.150
By restricting the land available for development to that within
the urban growth boundary, the boundary is likely to create pressure
to develop marginal lands, vulnerable to natural disaster, that have
escaped development because of that risk,151 as well as pressure to
redevelop hazardous urban areas that have fallen into disuse.
Natural hazard vulnerabilities can, of course, play a role in the
designation of urban growth boundaries. For example, Metro, the
elected regional government for the Portland metropolitan area,
encourages towns to use seismic hazard maps when designating
“urban reserve areas”—areas that will “eventually be brought inside
the urban growth boundary.”152 Presumably, this discretion is meant
to allow towns to ensure that areas with particularly high seismic
risks will not be brought within the boundary as it expands.
Moreover, in the designation of “rural reserves”—those lands
outside the urban growth boundary that are designated for longterm protection from urban development—counties are required to
consider a number of factors, including whether the land is “subject
to natural disasters or hazards, such as floodplains, steep slopes, and
areas subject to landslides.”153
150. See id.; see also Urban Growth Boundary, OR. METRO (2011),
http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=277 (explaining that one benefit of
the urban growth boundary is incentivizing the “develop[ment] and redevelop[ment of] land
and buildings in the urban core, helping keep core ‘downtowns’ in business”).
151. See generally Raymond J. Burby et al., Urban Containment Policy and Exposure to
Natural Hazards: Is There a Connection?, 44 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 475 (2001)
(suggesting that urban growth boundaries might increase urban exposure to natural hazards—
and thus disaster losses—by funneling development toward riskier locations within the urban
boundary that had previously gone undeveloped because of hazard exposure).
152. SPANGLE ASSOCS., OR. METRO, EVALUATION OF EARTHQUAKE HAZARD MAPS FOR
THE PORTLAND METROPOLITAN REGION OF OREGON, FINAL PROJECT REPORT 13 (1999),
available at http://www.metro-region.org/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=15789. According to
the report,
Metro is encouraging towns to use the relative earthquake hazard map in
designating urban reserve areas, which are areas that will eventually be brought
inside the urban growth boundary. Metro also incorporated the maps into the
Natural Hazards chapter of its Regional Framework Plan adopted by the Council in
December 1997.
Id.
153. OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., DIVISION 27, URBAN AND RURAL
RESERVES IN THE PORTLAND METROPOLITAN AREA 660-027-0060(3)(b) (2007), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/metro_urban_and_rural_reserves.shtml.
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The initial urban growth boundaries are, however, determined
primarily by the extant urban form and existing growth patterns.
When deciding where to channel growth, the disaster risk of areas
already within current city limits (and thus presumptively within the
urban growth boundary) is not compared to the disaster risk of areas
that are likely to be outside the urban growth boundary. This
approach may be particularly problematic when the boundary is
being drawn around a city with high disaster risk.
Portland, Oregon, is exactly such a city. Three major seismic
faults run under the densest portions of Portland, and estimates are
that a future earthquake along these faults might result in as many as
7800 deaths and injuries, and over $12 billion in direct economic
damages.154 In addition to earthquakes, the City of Portland has
other natural hazard risks, including floods, extreme weather, and
landslides.155 A Portland State University study of the city’s hazard
risks found that “thirteen neighborhoods are at risk in a ‘triple
hazard area,’ which combines the highest rates of peak ground
acceleration [during a 100-year earthquake], 100-year flood risk and
potential toxic release sites.”156 Most of these neighborhoods are in
the densest regions of the city, such as the downtown area.157
Another study found that some of the most devastating landslides
have occurred, and are likely to occur again, in the West Hills
neighborhood,158 which is within the metropolitan urban growth
boundary and is experiencing rapid development.
Furthermore, despite the fact that the city’s hazard mitigation
plan observes that a storm more serious than the 100-year flood
“could bring floodwaters over the downtown seawall and into the
central business district,”159 the City of Portland Bureau of Planning
154. YUMEI WANG & J. L. CLARK, EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE IN OREGON: PRELIMINARY
ESTIMATES OF FUTURE EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, SPECIAL PAPER 29, at 4, 5 (1999) (summary),
available at http://oregongeology.org/sub/earthquakes/SP29SUMMARY.pdf.
155. Id.
156. Dana Dickman et al., Spatial Analysis of Hazard Risk Factors for Vulnerable
Populations in Portland, Oregon, BROADMOOR PREPARES (April 30, 2007), http://
www.broadmoorprepares.com/resources/Spatial+Analysis+of+Hazrad+Risk+Factors+for+Vuln
erable+Population+in+Portland$2C+Oregon.pdf.
157. Id.
158. SCOTT F. BURNS ET AL., LANDSLIDES GEOHAZARD MAP FOR PORTLAND, OR., USA
5 (2006), available at http://www.iaeg.info/iaeg2006/PAPERS/IAEG_520.PDF.
159. CITY OF PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLAN. & SUSTAINABILITY, HUMAN HEALTH AND
SAFETY, PORTLAND PLAN 112 (2009), available at www.portlandonline.com/
portlandplan/index.cfm?a=346241&c=51427I.
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and Sustainability has urged reclamation of the downtown districts
bordering the river.160 Indeed, following the pattern noted in the
prior section,161 Portland’s redevelopment districts are clustered
around the riverfront. Portland currently has eleven “Urban Renewal
Areas,”162 eight of which front on either the Willamette or the
Columbia River, or both.163 Parts of many of these districts are
undoubtedly in the 100-year floodplain, or at least the inundation
plain of Portland’s 1996 flood, which exceeded that of the predicted
100-year flood.164
In 2003, Portland’s South Waterfront Redevelopment Project
won a prestigious Phoenix award from an environmental foundation
for its work in reclaiming underutilized urban sites.165 The thenExecutive Director of the Portland Development Commission
explained that redevelopment projects like South Waterfront are
“leading the way [in] reclaiming unproductive sites in the city,” and
that “this type of reclamation is going to be key to the city’s
economic future” because “Portland is facing a shortage of large
developable sites.”166
160. The River Plan, CITY OF PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLAN. & SUSTAINABILITY,
http://www.portlandonline.com/bps/index.cfm?c=42540 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
161. See supra notes 81–104 and accompanying text.
162. Current Projects, PORTLAND DEV. COMM’N, http://www.pdc.us/currentwork/
default.asp (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
163. Portland’s eight riverfront urban renewal areas are Airport Way, Downtown
Waterfront, Interstate Corridor, River District, Central Eastside, North Macadam, Oregon
Convention Center, and Willamette Industrial. See Urban Renewal Area Map (All URAs),
PORTLAND DEV. COMM’N, http://www.pdc.us/pubs/inv_detail.asp?id=635&ty=57 (last
visited Oct. 24, 2011) (showing the Airport Way Urban Renewal Area along the Columbia
River; the Downtown Waterfront, River District, Central Eastside, North Macadam, Oregon
Convention Center, and Willamette Industrial Urban Renewal Areas along the Willamette
River; and the Interstate Corridor Urban Renewal Area, bordering both the Columbia and
Willamette Rivers). Only the following three Portland Urban Renewal Areas are not located
along the riverfront: Lents Towncenter, Gateway, and South Park Blocks. See id.
164. See id.; Hazard Map, OR. METRO, http://tinyurl.com/85j8mhy (follow “Hazard
Map” hyperlink for map of Metro region) (last visited Dec. 3, 2011). Interestingly, despite the
abundance of GIS data Metro makes available on its website, including the ability to overlay
everything from the urban growth boundary to the FEMA 100-year floodplain, no map
appears to allow overlay of urban renewal areas and either the FEMA 100-year floodplain or
the 1996 inundation plain.
165. News Release: South Waterfront Redevelopment Project Wins National Phoenix
Award, PORTLAND DEV. COMM’N, http://www.pdc.us/new/releases/2003/ 20030917.asp
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). The South Waterfront Redevelopment Area was formerly the
North Macadam Urban Renewal Area. See ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82,
at 146.
166. See News Release: South Waterfront Redevelopment Project Wins National Phoenix
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The urban growth boundary may also complicate efforts to set
aside natural preserves in areas of high disaster exposure within the
city’s limits. Portland’s Planning Bureau has acknowledged that the
urban growth boundary has had the “unintended consequence” of
communicating to residents that “all nature exists outside of the
boundary, and there’s nothing natural within.”167 This attitude has
already been an obstacle to “preserv[ing] natural areas and creat[ing]
new ones within Portland’s city limits.”168 It seems equally likely to
impede any efforts to avoid development or redevelopment of areas
with high natural hazards exposure by designating them as large
tracts of green, open space.
Portland’s waterfront redevelopment efforts have won acclaim
with environmentalists, in part, because the city employs many Smart
Growth techniques to improve river ecology and to increase access
to, and recreation along, the rivers. Those techniques tend to create
larger development-free buffer zones along rivers, and thus mitigate
some flooding risk.169 However, the Smart Growth approach also
dictates dense, transit-oriented development in these same riverfront
urban renewal areas.170
Beautiful waterfront promenades and trails should not disguise
the fundamental fact that Portland’s efforts are likely increasing
disaster vulnerability by bringing people and property back to the
water’s edge—or at least very close to it. Nor should we lose sight of
the fact that this shift is being subsidized, in no small measure, by
public funding—both state and federal. Portland’s South Waterfront
Development, for example, is being funded by “$219 million in
public investment[] and $131 million in tax increment financing.”171
It represents the “largest single development project in Portland

Award, supra, note 165.
167. See ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82, at 138 (quoting Gil Kelley,
Portland Planning Bureau).
168. Id.
169. For example, Portland’s Planning Bureau has begun implementing a new mandatory
100-foot “greenway setback along the Willamette [River],” a significant improvement over the
prior 25-foot setback. See id. at 140.
170. See,
e.g.,
River
District,
Objective,
PORTLAND
DEV.
COMM’N,
http://www.pdc.us/ura/river.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (describing plans to transform
the River District into a mixed-use, “high density urban residential neighborhood,” with
housing density averaging “100 units per acre”).
171. ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82, at 146. The development hopes
to attract another $1.6 billion in private funds. See id.
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history.”172 One can only imagine the predicament the city might
find itself in if the redeveloped areas suffer serious flooding losses
and the city loses the future revenue stream it is depending on to
meet its bond obligations.173
C. California’s New Growth Management Approach: SB 375
California’s SB 375 is a new entry in the fight to halt suburban
sprawl and direct growth back into existing urban areas.174 Enacted
in October 2008, SB 375 is intended to help California meet its
statutory goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels
by the year 2020. To accomplish this aim, SB 375 changes the way
regional planning agencies allocate housing needs between different
communities to promote transit-oriented development and thereby
reduce vehicle miles traveled.175
While the precise effect of SB 375 is difficult to determine at this
time, the nonprofit Partnership for Sustainable Communities
predicts that SB 375 will likely allocate “more housing to already
dense cities rather than to lower-density communities” because, even
with increased density, suburbs may lack the critical mass necessary
for successful public transportation. Thus, “[i]ncreasing the density
of a sprawling suburb won’t necessarily reduce vehicle miles traveled

172. Id.
173. Portland’s Development Commission explains the tax-increment financing it uses
for urban renewal as follows:
Urban renewal districts raise money by borrowing against future growth in property taxes.
The city uses the borrowed money to pay for capital improvements, which spur more
development. The city then uses the incremental increase in property taxes from the
district to repay the loan. When the urban renewal district expires in 20–25 years, the
intent is to return a much higher property tax base to the tax rolls.
Frequently Asked Questions, PORTLAND DEV. CORP., http://www.pdc.us/about_pdc/faqs.asp
(follow “What is Tax Increment Financing”) (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). If that increase in
property taxes does not materialize, the city’s ability to repay its loan obligations will be
jeopardized.
174. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65080–65086.5 (West 2009).
175. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 38.500–38.599 (West 2009), requires California to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Id. § 38.550. One of the eighteen emissions reduction
measures adopted by the California Air Resources Board, which is charged with implementing
the Act, is reducing vehicle miles traveled by promoting transit-oriented development. See
California: A Primer on AB 32 and SB 375, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES.,
http://www.p4sc.org/articles/all/california-primer-ab-32-and-sb-375 (last visited Oct. 24,
2011).
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in the region.”176 “By contrast, increasing the number of people
living in cities and compact suburbs where transit and amenities are
already in place may have a bigger impact on regional emissions,
because those people will tend to walk to stores and take transit to
work.”177
When allocating housing needs on a regional basis, SB 375
directs councils of government to develop a methodology that
incorporates a number of factors, including the opportunities for,
and restraints on, growth in different jurisdictions.178 As part of that
analysis, the councils are directed to consider the “availability of land
suitable for urban development” including “opportunities for infill
development and increased residential densities.”179 In determining
what available land is suitable for urban development, the councils
may—but are not required to—“exclude lands where the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of
Water Resources has determined that the flood management
infrastructure designed to protect that land is not adequate to avoid
the risk of flooding.”180
This discretionary power to exclude flood-prone land with
inadequate “flood management infrastructure” from the calculation
of land suitable for urban development provides only a weak
assurance that councils will not channel growth into risky areas. The
exclusion standard is both vague and underinclusive,181 and, in any
event, the decision to exclude land is at the council’s discretion.
Although only time will tell how local councils will implement SB
375, and how they will exercise their discretion to exclude land
subject to flood hazard from the calculus, the strong push toward
increasing density raises the concern that, as with redevelopment
districts and urban growth boundaries, natural hazard risk will be at
most a secondary consideration in the growth planning process.

176. California: A Primer on AB 32 and SB 375, supra note 175.
177. Id.
178. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65584.04(d)(2)(B).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. The standard does not take into account other hazard risks (like seismicity and
wildfire) and also comes into play only when there is a judgment by FEMA or the state that
the relevant levees or other structural flood protection infrastructure is lacking. Much of this
flood protection infrastructure is inadequately monitored and evaluated.
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V. THE WAY FORWARD
One of the foundational and most often cited definitions of
sustainability comes from the Bruntland Commission of the United
Nations in 1987: “Sustainable development is development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.”182 Cities typically have
a very long lifespan. Committing future generations to patterns of
urban development that increase disaster risk, rather than mitigate it,
may compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs
just as surely as profligate consumption of finite resources or humaninduced climate change. And yet, current approaches to sustainability
appear to be driving exactly that kind of unsustainable development,
by channeling growth back into particularly vulnerable existing cities
and into the riskiest parts of those cities—a result we might aptly
describe as “Smart Growth in dumb places.”
This failure to take adequate account of the disaster risks of
redeveloping existing cities is not entirely surprising. There may be
good reasons to expect that developers, city planners, local
politicians, and the general public will systematically underestimate
the disaster risks associated with redeveloping or increasing the
density of existing urban areas. As Cass Sunstein has frequently
argued, individuals faced with imperfect information about risk (and
limited time, resources, and mental energy to devote to seeking out
and processing further information) may form their own assessment
of risk by relying on the perceived collective judgment of others.183
Thus, an individual assessing the risk of building in a particular area
where many others have already built—such as a densely populated
urban area—may incorrectly conclude that the hazard risk is lower
than it actually is simply because she observes that many other
individuals have apparently concluded that it was a “safe enough”
area in which to build.184 The flood-risk analysis in the Sacramento
182. U.N. G.A., Report of the World Comm’n on Environment and Development: Our
Common Future, transmitted to the General Assembly as Annex to ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427
(Mar. 20, 1987), available at http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm.
183. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 721–22 (1999).
184. Cf. Half Truths v. Whole Truths, REDWOOD CITY SALTWORKS,
http://www.insidesaltworks.com/?p=169 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (defending a plan to
redevelop as residential property a salt harvesting facility on the San Francisco Bay in Redwood
City, despite the fact that the area is an earthquake liquefaction zone, on the grounds that “the
substrate at the Saltworks site is the same as many other areas in the Bay Area”).
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River District EIR may exemplify this kind of thinking: the existing
levees make current development “safe,” the expanded development
will not damage the levees, ergo the expanded development is also
“safe.”185 Such thinking impedes our ability to take seriously the
disaster risks inherent in urban infill when the existing development
that surrounds the area is subject to similar risks.
Likewise, hazards that are viewed as familiar, commonplace,
everyday risks are often underestimated.186 Individuals who live in
cities vulnerable to natural disasters may adopt the attitude that every
place is risky in some way and may view that vulnerability as just one
of the many risks of modern life.187
Moreover, local politicians almost always favor redevelopment
and growth of existing cities, even in the face of substantial hazard
risk. Growth is the bread and butter of city politics. The
“conventional wisdom” is that a “bigger,” more populous city
“means more jobs, more taxpayers, more revenue, better education,
better services—in essence, a higher standard of living” for current
city residents.188 Once a city is established, city leaders work hard to
encourage more people to move there. And, even when a city suffers
large population declines, it typically fights hard to reinvigorate and
redevelop neighborhoods that are “emptying out.”189 Only a few
American cities with declining population have affirmatively
embraced their shrinking footprint, budget, and population.190 Even
185. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
186. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
37 (2005) (“A risk that is familiar, like that associated with smoking, will be seen as more
serious than a risk that is less familiar . . . .”); see also id. at 43 (“People are far more willing to
tolerate familiar risks than unfamiliar ones, even if they are statistically equivalent.”) (emphasis
omitted); Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN L.J.
1, 3 (2002) (“By contrast, other risks are so familiar that ‘social attenuation of risk’ takes place.
Because a danger is taken for granted, the risk is systematically underestimated and insufficient
measures are taken to prevent it.”) (summarizing Sunstein’s arguments).
187. See, e.g., With Earthquake Likely, Groups Promote Plans to Minimize Damage and
Deaths, BAY VOICES, http://xpress.sfsu.edu/bayvoices/2011/01/with-earthquake-likelygroups.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (noting that many residents of San Francisco do not
take earthquake risk into account in deciding where to live, citing one resident who explained
that “Mother Nature is going to have her fury, no matter where you live in the country” and
that the amount of earthquake retrofitting a particular building had undertaken mattered less
to his housing decision than “location and a washer and dryer”).
188. Timothy Aeppel, Shrink to Fit: As Its Population Declines, Youngstown Thinks
Small—Rather Than Trying To Grow, Ohio City Plans More Open Space, WALL ST. J., May 3,
2007, at A1.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Brentin Mock, Can They Save Youngstown?, NEXT AMERICAN CITY, July
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after major natural disasters lay bare the vulnerability of a particular
urban location, a city typically engages in a concerted effort both to
encourage the return of displaced residents and to attract new
residents.191 Moreover, politicians are hardly masters of delayed
gratification, and the revenue benefits of redeveloping risky land are
often realized in the short-term, whereas the costs of future disasters
may not occur until long after any given politician (or city planner)
has left the scene.192
These factors might suggest that the problems identified in this
Article are intractable—and they are difficult indeed. Simply
recognizing the tension between existing sustainability approaches
and disaster risk is, however, an important first step. We must also
recognize that there will, inevitably, be tradeoffs. If we choose not to
revitalize existing urban cores, more rural lands (including prime
agricultural land) will be consumed. If we choose not to redevelop
waterfront brownfields, those brownfields may never be cleaned up.
Moreover, despite the importance of disaster mitigation in
minimizing future human suffering and economic losses, disaster risk
can only be one consideration in deciding where to channel future
growth. If, for example, we locate new growth farther from water,
those areas may have difficulty securing and transporting an adequate
water supply. Other relevant factors include culture, energy
consumption and carbon footprint, economic potential, natural
resources, transportation networks, and other environmental
considerations. South Florida’s predicament exemplifies these
tensions: channeling growth to the east will likely exacerbate
hurricane and other flooding risks; yet channeling growth to the
west will endanger the Everglades eco-system and perhaps
compromise the region’s water supply.193
The question, then, is how we can best ensure that the tradeoffs
we make are well informed and well considered. This Article surely

2008, available at http://americancity.org/magazine/article/can-they-save-youngstown/
(explaining how Youngstown, Ohio, is “owning its population deficit” and embracing a
“shrinking city model,” in which “the shrunk city demolishes blocks, converting its abandoned
buildings and houses into open space for neighborhood enterprises and to nurture greenery”).
191. See, e.g., Alana Gomez Dong, Galveston Tries to Rebuild Population,
CLICK2HOUSTON (June 5, 2009), http://www.click2houston.com/news/19671162/
detail.html (discussing Galveston, Texas’s efforts to increase population after Hurricane Ike).
192. See MILETI, supra note 7, at 160.
193. See supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text.
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raises more questions than it can answer, but I offer some
preliminary thoughts.
First, we need to broaden the current conversation about
sustainability to include discussion of disaster risk. Broadening the
conversation will require bringing the right players to the table. At
the federal level, the interagency Partnership for Sustainable
Communities should be expanded to include the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). Currently, this interagency
partnership brings together the federal agencies that exert the most
direct and sustained influence on local land-use planning, with the
conspicuous omission of FEMA. FEMA administers perhaps the
most far-reaching of any federal program designed to influence local
land-use decisions: the National Flood Insurance Program.194 It also
administers Pre-disaster Mitigation Grants and post-disaster Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program funds195 and oversees the development
and approval of state and local hazard mitigation plans under the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000,196 which are supposed to help guide
state and local development away from natural hazards.
The omission of FEMA from the Partnership may be a reflection,
in part, of FEMA’s current status as a mere sub-department of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as it was demoted from
cabinet-level status by the Homeland Security Act of 2002197 that
created DHS.198 Whatever the cause, FEMA’s absence from the
Partnership perpetuates a vision of sustainability in which
consideration of natural hazards plays, at best, a secondary role. The
failure to give a prominent role to disaster mitigation is perhaps
confirmed by the Partnership’s six “guiding livability principles,”
none of which mentions disaster risk.199 Including FEMA in the
194. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61 (1985) (describing how the National Flood Insurance Program
impacts local land-use decisions).
195. See Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hma/index.shtm (outlining the hazard mitigation
programs administered by FEMA).
196. Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1558–59, § 322
(2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5165 (2006) ).
197. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101–557 (2006)) (conditioning hazard mitigation funds on state
development of approved natural disaster mitigation plans).
198. See 6 U.S.C. § 316.
199. The Partnership’s six livability principles are: (1) “provide more transportation
choices,” (2) “promote equitable, affordable housing,” (3) “enhance economic
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Partnership would ensure the presence of a strong proponent of
disaster mitigation at the table to help generate interagency
discussion of, and attention to, the issue. FEMA’s inclusion in the
Partnership would also have the benefit of signaling to planners and
grant applicants that disaster mitigation is, indeed, an important
component of sustainability.
At the state and local level, broadening the sustainability
dialogue to include disaster mitigation will require bridging existing
gaps between planners and emergency managers. Traditionally, landuse and growth issues are the province of local land-use planners,
while disaster mitigation is the province of emergency managers.200
To end the stove piping of these issues, local officials will have to see
past some of these traditional boundaries. The federal government or
state governments could help incentivize such cross-fertilization by
requiring integration of state and local hazard mitigation plans,
developed under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, into local
general plans that guide zoning decisions.201
competitiveness,” (4) “support existing communities,” (5) “coordinate and leverage
investment,” and (6) “value communities and neighborhoods.” Partnership For Sustainable
Communities: EPA-HUD-DOT, supra note 29. How significant FEMA’s omission from the
Partnership is depends, of course, on both the role and influence of the Partnership and
whether the existing agency partners nonetheless choose to bring disaster mitigation to the
forefront in their decisionmaking. Thus far, the most visible Partnership activities have been
joint administration of grants. HUD awarded $100 million dollars in Sustainable Communities
Regional Planning Grants in October, 2010. See Press Release, HUD, HUD Awards Nearly
$100 Million in New Grants to Promote Smarter and Sustainable Planning For Jobs and
Economic Growth (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-233.
The
grant
guidelines did encourage cities to address natural hazards in their regional planning, which
suggests that FEMA’s absence from the partnership may not mean that disaster risks are
neglected. See Notice of Funding Availability for HUD’s Fiscal Year 2010 Sustainable
Communities Regional Planning Grant Program, DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV.,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/grants/nofa10/scrpg.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011)
(click through program section) (noting that funds will be available to support development of
regional plans for sustainable development that, inter alia, “proactively consider[s] risks from
disasters and climate change”). There is some value in putting the onus on HUD, DOT, and
EPA to think about disaster risk themselves, and the agencies seem to be doing a decent job of
considering disaster risk; however, even when agencies are trying to think holistically, they are
likely to give the most weight to their primary existing mandates.
200. See Integrating Hazard Mitigation into Local Planning, AM. PLANNING ASS’N,
http://www.planning.org/research/hazards/index.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011)
(explaining that hazard mitigation is often the “exclusive domain” of emergency managers, and
planners typically have little interaction or input in the mitigation process).
201. See, e.g., Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government
Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604
ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 184 (2006) (urging that the Disaster
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Because land-use decisions are typically a state and local
prerogative and approaches to land-use planning vary from state to
state, state legislatures may be in the best position to encourage
intergration of hazard mitigation into land-use decisions by, for
example, amending their state enabling acts to require consideration
of hazard mitigation in land-use planning. Moreover, when a state or
locality adopts sustainability policies or legislation, it should include
disaster mitigation as an important component and goal of
sustainability. New York, for example, should consider amending its
recently adopted Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy Act to
include attention to disaster risk as one of its Smart Growth
criteria.202
Second, in addition to bringing more players to the table and
bridging existing gaps between those players, we need more forums
for discussion of the role of disaster mitigation in long-term
sustainability. Regional visioning projects provide opportunities for
comprehensive consideration of all of the factors—including disaster
risk—that should influence decisionmaking about where future
growth should occur. The post-Katrina vision for Louisiana,
Louisiana Speaks, was the first regional vision to give serious
consideration to disaster risk.203 Regions now embarking on
visioning projects should follow Louisiana’s example; it should not
take another tragic disaster to motivate regions to make disaster
mitigation an important component of visioning. Including disaster
mitigation in regional visioning is especially critical now that
California lawmakers have given such visioning—also called
blueprinting—a central role in that state’s efforts to achieve
greenhouse gas reductions, and other states may be inclined to
follow suit.204
Mitigation Act of 2000 be amended to require integration of mitigation plans into local
comprehensive plans as a condition of receiving federal funding for hazard mitigation). At the
federal level, integration is currently required only for “enhanced mitigation plans,” that
qualify the state for additional mitigation funds. 44 C.F.R. § 201.5(b)(1) (2010).
202. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
203. See Louisiana Speaks, LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTH., http://lra.louisiana.gov/
index.cfm?md=subsite&tmp=home&ssid=1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
204. See SB 375 Connects Land Use and AB 32 Implementation, THE PLAN. REP.,
http://www.planningreport.com/tpr/?module=displaystory&story_id=1257&format=html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“[SB 375] requires the 18 metropolitan planning organizations
across the state of California to show that their future planning scenarios will result in a
reduction in carbon. The requirement will engage regions in a process similar to a process
pioneered [in] Sacramento, known as ‘the blueprint,’ which essentially says that we need to
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Additionally, states might experiment with procedural
mechanisms for consideration of disaster risk akin to the EIR
required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)205 or
the environmental impact statement (EIS) required for some federal
projects by the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act.206 Such
experiments might involve expanding existing environmental impact
assessments to include a more explicit focus on disaster risk or
crafting new, separate disaster impact assessment requirements.
Currently, however, California is moving in the opposite direction,
limiting the reach of CEQA.207 Indeed, California’s legislature
recently amended CEQA to sharply limit EIR requirements for the
very kind of developments most at issue in this Article: infill
projects.208
Third, broadening the conversation about sustainability and
disaster risk also means expanding the options being considered
when charting a sustainable future. The risks of redeveloping urban
areas must, of course, be weighed against the costs and risks of
alternative growth patterns. Sprawl, however, is not necessarily the
only alternative strategy. States, regions, or cities might decide, for
instance, that they should be planning for new urban cores in less
risky locations, rather than publicly subsidizing either sprawling
suburbs or the shifting of existing urban cores toward hazardous
areas through strategies like waterfront redevelopment. The map of
major cities does not always need to look exactly as it does today.
Indeed, the creation of new cities or centers of growth may be
inevitable, as existing urban centers are unlikely to be able to

plan as a region, not just as individual cities and counties.” (quoting Calif. Sen. Darrell
Steinberg)).
205. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (explaining that the EIS is designed to require agencies to
take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of prospective projects but does not impose
any substantive mandate on agency decisionmaking).
207. See Richard Frank, CEQA “Reform” in California: 3-For-3, LEGAL PLANET: THE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 7, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/10/07/
ceqa-reform-in-california-3-for-3/ (summarizing recent amendments to CEQA limiting
CEQA’s reach).
208. See S. 226, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Cal. 2011) (expanding the definition of infill
projects and limiting the scope of EIRs for qualifying projects by, inter alia, eliminating the
need to consider significant effects addressed in prior EIRs, alternative locations, and
“[g]rowth inducing impacts”).
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accommodate all future growth unless we redevelop them at
densities that are unacceptable to many citizens.
Serious consideration should also be given to the controversial,
indeed almost unthinkable, option that certain cities or regions
simply should not grow at all. If South Florida, for example, cannot
grow without either concentrating people and resources in areas with
serious hurricane and flooding risk or threatening the region’s water
resources by encroaching on the Everglades, then perhaps local and
state leaders need to be asking hard questions about whether, and
under what circumstances, growth can reasonably occur.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that cities and states will ask these tough
questions so long as the costs of disaster are largely externalized—by
subsidized flood insurance and generous post-disaster relief—to the
nation as a whole.
This dilemma suggests that we must take a hard look at
subsidization of the development (and redevelopment) of hazardous
areas—whether that subsidization takes the form of the National
Flood Insurance Program, HUD money for urban redevelopment,
or state and local tax dollars for urban infill. It is, of course, possible
that the economic benefits of redeveloping certain risky urban
locations justify the periodic disaster costs that will be incurred, but
public underwriting of the costs of both redevelopment and disasters
skews current development decisionmaking in favor of investment in
hazardous locations.
Fourth, if cities do choose to redevelop particularly vulnerable
areas despite the disaster risks, those redevelopment efforts should
employ an urban form that either helps mitigate current risks or will
facilitate strategic retreat in the future. For example, some experts
have suggested that strategic retreat can be more easily accomplished
if a waterfront community is built around a series of roads (and
utilities) that run perpendicular to the coast, rather than being built
around a coastal road that runs parallel to the waterfront’s edge.209
Such an urban design allows communities to make some concessions
to the water over time (by ceding the property and stretches of road
closest to the water) without losing all coastal access and road and
utility infrastructure.210 Urban redevelopment, then, can at least be
209. See TURBOTT & STEWART, supra note 18, at 30–31 (explaining how networks of
roads that run perpendicular to, rather than parallel to, shorelines can facilitate a process of
managed retreat from coastal hazards).
210. See id.
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an opportunity to ease the way to more permanent mitigation
measures that may be necessary down the road.
Fifth, in assessing where we ought to channel growth we must
employ a more thoughtful conception of risk than has traditionally
been used in land-use decisions. For example, more attention needs
to be given to the residual risk of areas protected from flooding by
structural flood protection measures such as levees. Decision makers
often entirely ignore this residual risk, despite the potentially
catastrophic results of levee failure or overtopping.
Moreover, too often the litmus test for deciding the
appropriateness of future floodplain development is whether that
land is located in the FEMA-designated 100-year flood plain.211
Although the 100-year flood designation has become a de facto
safety standard, it was never intended as such and does not represent
any kind of reasoned judgment about what kind of risk is acceptable,
and for what purposes.212 This standard is particularly problematic as
the effects of climate change may mean that the 100-year storm
becomes the 70-year storm, or even the 30-year storm.213
Unfortunately, at least for floods and hurricanes, the historical record
may no longer be a particularly accurate predictor of future disaster.
As one beleaguered emergency manager dealing with flooding along
the Red River recently complained, the 100-year storm seems to be
coming “every year.”214
Of course, once we move away from the 100-year floodplain
standard, it is hard to know what should replace it. Recent legislation
in California will soon require that urban developments be protected

211. See, e.g., supra note 120–122 and accompanying text.
212. See Levee System Evaluation for the National Flood Insurance Program Fact Sheet,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS (2010), http://www.usace.army.mil/LeveeSafety/
KeyDocuments/Pages/lev_keydocs.aspx#eval (“The FEMA 100-year flood is a flood
insurance standard, not a public safety standard.”).
213. See, e.g., Paul Kirshen et al., Coastal Flooding in the Northeastern United States Due
to Climate Change, 13 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE
437 (2008) (concluding that under a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario, the 100-year
storm in the northeastern United States could become the 30-year storm by 2050; under a
lower emissions scenario, the 100-year storm could become the 70-year storm).
214. In Minnesota, Melting Snow Means Major Floods, NPR (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/21/134743008/In-Minnesota-Melting-Snow-Means-MajorFloods (quoting the mayor of Moorhead, Minnesota, located across the river from Fargo,
North Dakota).
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from the 200-year flood.215 However, simply picking another nice,
round (but arbitrary) number cannot be the right answer.
In sum, what may be required is a more holistic approach, so
that the cumulative effects of individual, disconnected development
decisions do not remake our cities in much more vulnerable forms.
Such a holistic approach would allow us to step back from individual
land-use decisions, and the policy commitments and economic
considerations that drive them, to view the contours of the cities we
are creating and to ask again whether there might be a better
approach. Many cities and regions are already attempting to
reimagine themselves, and sustainability initiatives can be an
important component of those visions, so long as inattention to
natural hazards does not transform those visions into nightmares.

215. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65007(l) (West 2009) (defining “urban level of flood
protection” as that necessary to withstand flooding that ‘‘has a 1-in-200 chance of occurring in
any given year’’).

2201

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2202

12/20/2011 3:26 PM

2011

